Two Sides of the Same Coin – Part II

This post will be a continuation of comments on the following journal article:

Marsh, Nicholas. “Two Sides of the Same Coin? The Legal and Illegal Trade in Small Arms.” The Brown Journal of World Affairs. Spring 2002.

As I discussed in my previous post Two Sides of the Same Coin – Part I Marsh delivers a good overall outline of the key issues in the legal and illegal arms trade. Having extracted and commented on some of his useful observations, I now offer some thoughts on his concluding recommendations:

Two valuable and under-represented recommendations presented relate to the need for greater domestic legislation around the globe, and connectedly, the need for greater domestic transparency – especially in regulations, tracking, and oversight of a government’s own exports. These are principled suggestions assuming that the government in question has nothing to hide and is willing to audit itself. The willingness of governments to monitor themselves is vital here as the international community does not seem currently capable of erecting an IAEA-type organization to govern arms transfers. Even if this was a possibility, tracking the illegal arms trade is much more nuanced than tracking illegal nuclear activity. Among other complexities, the illegal arms trade is simultaneously a much more widespread and a much more concealable problem.

The two other policy recommendations provided are less helpful. The first is to sign the UN firearms treaty. Keep in mind this paper was written in 2002 and there have since been several arms control efforts at the UN and other international or regional organizations. For instance, the present focus falls on the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). However, whether governments choose to sign such treaties or not does not depend on a white paper recommendation unfortunately. It depends on a host of other factors, not least of which are material incentives such as profits as well as domestic political will.

The other recommendation that I dismiss is for governments to stop partaking in gray market activity, especially since it often spills over into the black market. Again, this is not something that a mere recommendation will change. Alternatives have to be provided to incentivize legitimate actors to walk away from years of established networks and profits in illegitimate activities such as trafficking. Additionally, this seems the most unrealistic of the four recommendations. While it should certainly remain an ideal of the arms control movement, it is unlikely to be a near-term reality. Governments that engage in gray market arms sales and transfers (including the United States), do so knowingly and willingly. It is a conscious decision, and though in some cases it may be a desperate measure, it is likely not a decision made haphazardly or whimsically. Clearly then, something about the risk-reward calculus encourages these participant governments and legal entities to go gray. So it would follow, then, that changing their ways will require more than a wag of the finger; would it not?

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