November 23, 2011

India’s Insurgency: (Illegally) Armed and Dangerous

By smallarmssasia

Recently, there has been a lot of media coverage on India’s Maoist insurgency. For years the Indo-China border was considered part of India’s dual threat (in addition, to the Indo-Pak border). India’s defense thinking very much accounts for the possibility of a two-front war – a simultaneous state-to-state conflict on two borders at once, or worse, two enemies acting as one. Today, some fear mongering still exists but the threat of an all-out war on either border seems less likely. Instead, the real security crisis for India today originates from an insurgent problem in both regions – one external; the other internal.

The internal insurgency is waged by Naxalites (also known as Maoists) and is spreading like wildfire from India’s Northeastern region to the rest of the country.[1] The term Naxalite covers several communist militant groups in different parts of India. They generally follow a Maoist interpretation of radical communist ideology (hence their more familiar label: ‘Maoists’). Often, however, they are more fundamentally tied to economic gains than to their ideological preachings. The Naxal movement originated in West Bengal in 1967 and has been an ever-increasing problem. For the last few years, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has again and again described the Maoists as India’s gravest internal threat.[2] Like most other insurgent movements, the Maoists claim to be fighting for the people. And also like most other insurgent movements, they ignore the hypocrisy of abusing, attacking, or killing their own in the process. As the insurgency grows, it seems, so does its violence.[3]

In India, arms trafficking is now both a cause and an effect of the spreading Maoist insurgency. The movement has both been assisted by other actors as well as itself facilitated a great deal of armed violence in the region. Sri Lanka’s infamous terrorist organization, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), is closely allied with India’s Maoist movement. For years, there have been reports of LTTE funneling illicit arms to the Maoists – and the latter have often returned the favor. Another suspected provider is the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA). And a third source for illegal weapons is suspected to be China.[4]

Though New Delhi appears to have some interesting strategies for dealing with the Maoists directly, it must also continue dealing with their dangerous affiliates.[5] When focusing on these partners in crime, policymakers should be careful to frame the Maoists’ escalating violence and emerging alliances in the context of India’s exploding illicit arms trade. To be sure, New Delhi cannot afford to underestimate the implications of the Maoists’ growing cross-border terrorist links. Equally significant, nonetheless, is the potential China connection. First, the sheer power of a state-supported insurgency could devastate parts of India – especially in providing access to resources that non-state actors often do not enjoy. Second, China in particular is the world’s cheapest producer of small arms and thus, makes their acquisition very easy even if that is all it does. Third, the age-old Indo-China tensions cannot be overlooked as a factor – at the very least, as possible motive to aid the Maoists covertly if not back them openly. Fourth, this would not be China’s first instance of gray market or black market transfers to illicit actors.[6] Think Zimbabwe. Think Sudan. Think Burma and Nepal (among a host of other conflict-ridden nations around the world).[7]

Peace comes at a price and India is paying it. Despite years of collecting evidence on China’s role as supplier, India is choosing to downplay the issue. They could have come from anywhere – even if they are Chinese-made weapons – is the generous assumption. (This could very well be a strategic move in light of recent baby-steps with Beijing.[8]) For instance, New Delhi’s official position is to delink evidence of Chinese weapons found with Indian insurgents (especially Maoists) from assumptions of China’s direct involvement. Ministry of External Affairs spokesman Vishnu Prakash two weeks ago confirmed that the insurgent issue would remain on Prime Minister Singh’s agenda for discussion with the Chinese representative at last week’s ASEAN Summit in Bali. Having said that, he followed by emphasizing the lack of any hard evidence clearly proving Chinese support to India’s insurgents: “All militant outfits including the Maoists would like us to believe that they have China’s support, but we are yet to see a smoking gun.”[9] I understand the immeasurable value of potential progress with Beijing. And I understand why New Delhi is working so hard not to jeopardize even small breakthroughs. Note that India and China are getting closer to jointly addressing the border security issues that plague them both – no small victory at all. Nonetheless, while it may be a strategic move to tone down accusations of China’s potential role in fueling the Maoists and other groups, I wonder if this un-negotiated price for peace is at all fair for those innocents caught in the crossfire. Moreover, can a sound and sustainable security agreement truly form where one country turns a blind eye to the other’s potential role in contributing to its insecurity? I sense commitment phobia on one side and denial on the other. Someone call a therapist.

[1] For those interested in more background on the Maoist insurgency itself, here are a few good quick reads:

[2] See, for instance:

[3] A closer look at a few resources makes this point evident:

[4] For more detailed information on these and other connections, see:

[5] Here are a couple of pieces detailing particular aspects of New Delhi’s treatment of and approach to the Naxalite problem:

[6] “Global Insights: Chinese Arms Sales Worry Washington.” World Politics Review. 17 March 2009.

  • Also see the links provided for the following three notes.

[7] For just a few of the many examples of China’s involvement in illicit arms transfers fueling armed conflict, see:

[8] Potential progress is reflected in current reporting on Indo-China diplomatic talks:

[9] “India, China Close to Agreement.” The Assam Tribune. 17 November 2011.

smallarmssasia

This entry was posted on Wednesday, November 23rd, 2011 at 6:08 PM and posted in Uncategorized. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed.

One response to “India’s Insurgency: (Illegally) Armed and Dangerous”

  • utopiaguatemala
    December 5th, 2011 at 4:47 AM

    Great post, very informative. The media is so focused on Kashmir and the disputes with Pakistan, that many people don’t know how big of a threat this insurgency is. I was reading an article a few months ago that said the government treats the Naxalite problem as one of “law and order” and leaves the counter-insurgency operations to the states that are affected by Naxalite attacks. The government has deployed the Central Reserve Police Force, but hasn’t deployed the military as it has in Kashmir. I wonder if this will change soon (or has changed already).

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