Small Arms Mass Destruction

I posted a useful visual on twitter and thought I should share the same here. So below is a Small Arms Mass Destruction chart, part of the PBS series on Women, War & Peace. Synthesizing some of the bigger picture facts about small arms, the chart looks at common weapon types, civilian versus military ownership, the illicit flow of arms, and small arms casualties globally. Below the image, I share a couple of thoughts and reactions.

• The flow of illicit arms section made me wonder if there is any project globally tracking hot zones for diversion, theft, or illicit transferring of small arms. The example given focuses on Sudan, and there are other known hot zones in Africa and across the globe. It would be fascinating to see where in the world arms smugglers mark their comfort zones. It would seem natural if the patterns emerging from such a global flow study ended up pointing to states rampant with corruption, states lacking infrastructure, and states with the weakest policing and law enforcement but it would be worth finding out if such hypotheses are backed by the data. Such a study would also be useful in understanding the global pattern because flow direction can often indicate origin and destination – which can be crucial to uprooting or terminating the illegal arms trade (if I can momentarily lapse into optimism). The challenge, of course, is information itself – its accessibility; its availability; its quality. (Black market data may not exactly be the easiest to crowdsource, after all.)
• I was highly surprised that after the U.S., Yemen had the highest firearm to population ratio – an astounding 5.9 guns to every 10 residents. Keep in mind though, this may not translate to 59% of the population being armed. It may, of course. But, more likely, those that are armed are in possession of multiple weapons. Also keep in mind the three violent groups in Yemen: the Houthi rebels, the Southern secessionists, and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). These groups certainly add fuel to the fire; the end result being armed violence – regardless of whether local individuals and tribes are taking up arms for or against their causes.
• As a sidenote, the chart does not specify but I believe the ownership statistics are based on registered firearms since it is nearly impossible to count illegal arms (especially in conflict zones). If this is true, Yemen’s 5.9/10 ratio is even more jarring. Who knows what else is out there…
• Final point: the global epidemic map made me pause to rethink some of my assumptions. Though it is limited to the 2004-09 period, I was struck by Afghanistan’s categorization in the middle of the death rate scale. According to this data, in Afghanistan an average of 10-20 of every 100,000 people died from small arms violence in Afghanistan (and that too, for five years before the 2009 U.S. troop surge). This number, unfortunately, seems a low estimate at best.
• Overall, the rest of the global picture makes more sense from region to region. Western countries and Southern parts of Latin America see the least deaths from small arms violence. The usual suspects such as Colombia and Sudan end up with some of the highest number of small arms casualties. That Guatemala and South Africa ranked in the highest category of death rates was, however, a bit surprising for me. I suppose media reporting bias affects all of our perceptions to some extent…

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Two Sides of the Same Coin – Part I

This post and the next one will be a two part reaction to one of the journal pieces listed in my earlier post on useful general resources:

Marsh, Nicholas. “Two Sides of the Same Coin? The Legal and Illegal Trade in Small Arms.” The Brown Journal of World Affairs. Spring 2002.

Nicholas Marsh and his team at the Norwegian Initiative for Small Arms Transfers (NISAT) contextualize illegal arms transfers by first presenting an overview of the mechanics of legal transfers. My intent is not to summarize the article, but to present a few synthesized observations that (while not all new) are worth noting:

• There are no legally binding international conventions or treaties to govern legal arms transfers. Transfers are currently based on national legislation – which obviously causes a great deal of irregularity.
• International law only interferes with legal arms transfers when one of the parties involved is under a recognized arms embargo – usually initiated by a regional or intergovernmental organization (IGO).
• In some ways it is easier to exert international control or oversight over weapons of mass destruction (WMD) transfers than those involving small arms and light weapons (SALW). There are IGOs and regional entities that have built in jurisdiction to get involved on the former issue since it is often perceived as a graver threat (even though the destruction caused by SALW is often worse). In contrast, there is no such organization with jurisdictional or regulatory power over small arms transfers. These must be self-regulated by the countries importing and exporting such weapons. Worse yet, most governments lack national legislation prohibiting sales or exports to particular kinds of regimes.
  • Attempts to fill this gap have been made. Of the many failed examples, one stands out as slightly better: the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. Despite its workable framework, Marsh and other experts have often described the EU Code simply as ‘well-intentioned legislative feebleness’” (Marsh, p.220).
• Existing estimates of the illegal arms trade are wide-ranging due to the immeasurable nature of the problem. The range spans from 10-20% to over 50% of the legal arms market. Marsh believes the lower end of the range is more likely accurate.
• Often times, the same illicit weapons in the hands of illegal actors today were originally produced and sold by legal means. Basic economics explain the diminishing value of these second-hand weapons with their repeated circulation. Though Marsh does not go down this route, it occurs to me that this could even serve to incentivize legal forces (national governments and militaries) to employ illegal weapons instead of their more expensive legally acquired counterparts.
• As is commonly understood, the illegal arms trade can be bifurcated to a black and gray market. The former exist beyond international or governmental control or awareness; whereas the latter exist with their participation or tacit approval.
  • The gray market peaked during the Cold War with all its proxy wars and competitive security. Under enemy-of-my-enemy thinking, both superpowers armed other national and non-state actors to undermine each others’ spheres of influence. A stark example is the U.S. (and Saudi Arabian) arming of mujahideen in Afghanistan and Pakistan to fight the 1980s anti-Soviet resistance. In just ten years, the U.S. alone spent over $2 billion on arming the Taliban and other non-state armed groups (NSAGs). How damaging is the gray market? Take a look at the aftermath of this single episode in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region two-decades later.
  • Post-Cold War era gray market transfers have not slowed down. Examples of illicit gray market activity frequently involve the U.S., Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. The recipients of gray market transfers as well as their ill-fated victims are often civilians in these last three regions.
  • The black market, on the other hand, is literally like a black hole. Transfers are generally conducted by private individuals, NSAGs, and other criminal entities – making them nearly impossible to track. Why so much demand for SALW? Well, if continued human conflict and competition is not a sufficient explanation, then perhaps practicality will be. As Marsh so accurately describes: “Small arms are lightweight, easy to conceal, can be used immediately by the purchaser, and can be recycled around the world’s conflicts” (Marsh, 223). These same features make SALW extremely attractive to end-users and smugglers alike.
  • Perhaps one of the most salient observations Marsh poses – one that is cited here and there in other papers on the topic, but too often goes unmentioned – is that after SALW “have entered the black market, they are effectively beyond government control and can be re-exported to other illegal clients throughout the weapon’s lifetime” (Marsh, 223). In other words, there can be no recalls or reversal mechanisms with this type of illegal activity.
  • The illegal market (especially the black market) is fueled by the loopholes and resulting ease of accessibility to weapons within the legal market. Diversion of weapons from the legal to illegal markets is one of the most common mechanisms for the acquisition of SALW. Five manners of diversion are particularly common: (1) the gray market – given that criminal actors and NSAGs are not easily controlled by national or international laws once they have weapons; (2) export licensing manipulations – especially forced documents such as end-user certificates; (3) theft from official government stockpiles – often involving inside assistance; (4) post-conflict collections of weapons from the battlefield – sort of a finders-keepers loophole; and (5) private individual weapons purchases through legal means for the illegal reselling to other actors.
• The role of arms brokers is fundamental in illegal arms transactions, and it is no easy role. It often involves intricate planning, deep pockets, and strong connections or networks. Further, the information required for these transfers is not easy to acquire given the necessarily covert nature of such illegal activity. Obviously since the market itself is illegal and exists underground, most nations have no way of regulating the activities of these brokers.
• Given their similarly complex requirements, illegal arms smuggling networks often overlap with other types of criminal networks. Marsh gives the example of the trade in conflict goods; but I can think of several other cases that might cross-apply – for instance, international drug trafficking. In fact, the overlapping economic interests in the illegal drug and arms markets are a recognized feature of many NSAGs including the Afghan Taliban as well as various Pakistani militant groups.

Part II of this review will offer some thoughts on Marsh’s policy recommendations. See you there…

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Old News That Remains New (I)

Over the next few posts – and every now and then – I will be digging through news archives and posting some interesting pieces. Some of these will go back a couple of years and some will go back a few months. Nonetheless, these pieces have proven their continued relevance and are being posted to contextualize current trends and events. I hope readers will find these as worthy of attention as I do. Let’s begin with a 2009 piece on the Taliban’s acquisition of small arms…

 

 

In September 2009, Danger Room reported that the Taliban Seeks Rifles with More ‘Punch’. Danger Room’s reporting was based on Ghaith Abdul-Ahad’s article in The Guardian: Trade in Guns & Drugs that Fuels War in Afghanistan. Abdul-Ahad sat down with Hekmat, an ordinary local shop-owner who made his real fortunes as a drug and weapons smuggler (compliments of the ongoing war in Afghanistan).

According to Hekmat, a monthly supply of $20,000 in weapons easily gets him $5,000 in profits. That’s a 25% profit margin on a monthly basis – no small amount for a villager in a country ripped to poverty over decades. And the majority of money does not come from the most common weapon, the AK-47 – the traditional Kalashnikov. These are actually one of the cheapest and most easily acquired (especially from the Chinese), costing a mere $400 a piece – perhaps explaining their decades of popularity among Taliban foot soldiers.

The higher profits come from the Kalakov, essentially a modernized AK-47 with smaller bullets and a lighter frame. Why the update? Hekmat observes that the Taliban now prefer the Kalakov because of its ability to pierce body armor. They are acquired for $700 and sold for $1,100 by sellers like Hekmat. One can discern the increasing demand in the increased sale price in a single year – they used to sell at $700 in Afghanistan.

The destruction of war is not so destructive for Afghans behind the illegal arms trade. Hekmat has no shame in declaring, “Yes, war is very good for business.” The police are no obstacle to this growing market either: “They take their cut. The border police chief is a smuggler himself, and no one can do smuggling without his knowledge.” It doesn’t seem far-fetched, then, for Abdul-Ahad to conclude that the real dangers of smuggling were in not being well-connected.

The lessons here are not trivial. With a better understanding of smugglers’ cost-benefit analysis, international efforts may find better approaches to disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs in Afghanistan. From a smuggler’s perspective, perhaps the risks and dangers of trafficking are entirely worth the profits and sustenance it can lead to. If that is true, then changing this cost-benefit calculus will be key for addressing the problem. And needless to say, better solutions to the problem of arms smuggling in Afghanistan will greatly affect the entire illegal arms trade in South Asia, especially in Pakistan.

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Background and Significance

When one thinks of the international arms trade, what generally comes to mind are the state-to-state transactions, the multinational companies, and the myriad treaties regulating an endless list of weapon types. What is often glanced over in this fleeting image is the underground international arms trade. This invisible part of the international arms market has gained as much from globalization as the legal weapons industry. For many buyers, it has provided a way to stay under the radar. More importantly, it has provided this with less hassle, less fees, less supervision, less regulation, and less accountability than the legal market – from economic, political, legal, and moral standpoints.

Non-state armed groups (NSAGs) have largely been the target customer as well as the prime broker of small arms sold on the black market. There is an irony in the fact that the suppliers and the demanders of small arms must often rely on each other as lifeblood. These mutually dependent actors may not, and often do not, share ideologies or beliefs; issues or grievances. Yet business underground, it turns out, is not too different from business above ground.

Since the end of the Cold War, more so than ever before, there has been a substantive and exponential rise in the illegal smuggling and trading of small arms. In the last two decades, there has been a correspondingly powerful (but perhaps not powerful enough) international movement to control small arms. This movement has grown into a transnational advocacy network with the involvement of the United Nations and international NGOs. Regional and local groups have also been critical to the exchange of information and the drawing of attention to the violence and casualties caused by small arms.

This blog will focus on efforts in South Asia, particularly in India and Pakistan. The reason for choosing this region is that it is one of the most deeply affected areas in the world when it comes to small arms proliferation and violence. Recently, there seems to be growing interest from international actors to address the problem here. This could be because the overall global campaign is itself broadening its reach. It could also be because the war in Afghanistan has forced the world to witness the reality of small arms violence in the region.  Pakistan and India are geospatially fated to the causes and effects at play here. Needless to say, these two countries are also entangled in their own messy relationship – one that emphatically fuels small arms violence in the region.

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