Guns Galore, Solutions Scarce

The Pakistan Muslim League (a political party) caught my eye the other day with an intriguing post on Guns Galore on their blog. Moving beyond my confused expression upon discovery of such a blog, I found the post surprisingly candid. I do not know how reliable its claims are or what its internal or public sources might be. However, I will be generous for a moment and give them the benefit of the doubt (but read quickly; this may literally only last a moment). If there is any validity to these statistics, the problem is even more rampant than imagined. A few lines particularly jumped out at me:

We have laws to regulate gun ownership and usage but they are widely flouted, and anybody who really wants a gun and has the money and contacts can be armed and dangerous within hours – minutes in some areas. Our elected representatives to federal and provincial assemblies all have a “quota” of firearms licences that they can issue to favoured constituents, and there are any number of “security guards” who tote a range of weaponry with an indifferent set of skills when it comes to usage. Add to this the millions of weapons that are in private hands, unlicensed and undeclared but lying under beds or in cupboards against domestic intrusion or just to keep handy in case of trouble, and you have a population that is armed out of all proportion to the need to physically protect itself. The recent case of “mis-declaration” is one of a chain stretching back years, has the connivance of “influentials” and corrupt customs officials and is unlikely to be broken by any half-hearted “investigation”.

What is surprising about this besides the colorful language? The accelerating speed of acquisition. The existence and admittance of a quota system. The trend of unlicensed private ownership (assumed here to refer to non-combatants and non-militants) despite the provisions for legal ownership. And not least of all, the acknowledgement of a population that “is armed out of all proportion to the need to physically protect itself.” If these are recognized problems, where are the efforts to address them? What am I missing here? Violence begets more violence and for many in India and Pakistan, escaping the vicious cycle is implausible or impossible if it dares to threaten their survival. The governments complain about insecurities arising from their neighbors (ie, each other) and yet it is the inability of these governments to effectively cut this cycle that actually further solidifies it for locals in far off villages. If the government cannot assure your security on a general level, if you have to answer to violent actors with nowhere else to go, if you are driven to acquire illegal guns just in case… Well what is the answer then?

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Two Sides of the Same Coin – Part I

This post and the next one will be a two part reaction to one of the journal pieces listed in my earlier post on useful general resources:

Marsh, Nicholas. “Two Sides of the Same Coin? The Legal and Illegal Trade in Small Arms.” The Brown Journal of World Affairs. Spring 2002.

Nicholas Marsh and his team at the Norwegian Initiative for Small Arms Transfers (NISAT) contextualize illegal arms transfers by first presenting an overview of the mechanics of legal transfers. My intent is not to summarize the article, but to present a few synthesized observations that (while not all new) are worth noting:

• There are no legally binding international conventions or treaties to govern legal arms transfers. Transfers are currently based on national legislation – which obviously causes a great deal of irregularity.
• International law only interferes with legal arms transfers when one of the parties involved is under a recognized arms embargo – usually initiated by a regional or intergovernmental organization (IGO).
• In some ways it is easier to exert international control or oversight over weapons of mass destruction (WMD) transfers than those involving small arms and light weapons (SALW). There are IGOs and regional entities that have built in jurisdiction to get involved on the former issue since it is often perceived as a graver threat (even though the destruction caused by SALW is often worse). In contrast, there is no such organization with jurisdictional or regulatory power over small arms transfers. These must be self-regulated by the countries importing and exporting such weapons. Worse yet, most governments lack national legislation prohibiting sales or exports to particular kinds of regimes.
  • Attempts to fill this gap have been made. Of the many failed examples, one stands out as slightly better: the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. Despite its workable framework, Marsh and other experts have often described the EU Code simply as ‘well-intentioned legislative feebleness’” (Marsh, p.220).
• Existing estimates of the illegal arms trade are wide-ranging due to the immeasurable nature of the problem. The range spans from 10-20% to over 50% of the legal arms market. Marsh believes the lower end of the range is more likely accurate.
• Often times, the same illicit weapons in the hands of illegal actors today were originally produced and sold by legal means. Basic economics explain the diminishing value of these second-hand weapons with their repeated circulation. Though Marsh does not go down this route, it occurs to me that this could even serve to incentivize legal forces (national governments and militaries) to employ illegal weapons instead of their more expensive legally acquired counterparts.
• As is commonly understood, the illegal arms trade can be bifurcated to a black and gray market. The former exist beyond international or governmental control or awareness; whereas the latter exist with their participation or tacit approval.
  • The gray market peaked during the Cold War with all its proxy wars and competitive security. Under enemy-of-my-enemy thinking, both superpowers armed other national and non-state actors to undermine each others’ spheres of influence. A stark example is the U.S. (and Saudi Arabian) arming of mujahideen in Afghanistan and Pakistan to fight the 1980s anti-Soviet resistance. In just ten years, the U.S. alone spent over $2 billion on arming the Taliban and other non-state armed groups (NSAGs). How damaging is the gray market? Take a look at the aftermath of this single episode in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region two-decades later.
  • Post-Cold War era gray market transfers have not slowed down. Examples of illicit gray market activity frequently involve the U.S., Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. The recipients of gray market transfers as well as their ill-fated victims are often civilians in these last three regions.
  • The black market, on the other hand, is literally like a black hole. Transfers are generally conducted by private individuals, NSAGs, and other criminal entities – making them nearly impossible to track. Why so much demand for SALW? Well, if continued human conflict and competition is not a sufficient explanation, then perhaps practicality will be. As Marsh so accurately describes: “Small arms are lightweight, easy to conceal, can be used immediately by the purchaser, and can be recycled around the world’s conflicts” (Marsh, 223). These same features make SALW extremely attractive to end-users and smugglers alike.
  • Perhaps one of the most salient observations Marsh poses – one that is cited here and there in other papers on the topic, but too often goes unmentioned – is that after SALW “have entered the black market, they are effectively beyond government control and can be re-exported to other illegal clients throughout the weapon’s lifetime” (Marsh, 223). In other words, there can be no recalls or reversal mechanisms with this type of illegal activity.
  • The illegal market (especially the black market) is fueled by the loopholes and resulting ease of accessibility to weapons within the legal market. Diversion of weapons from the legal to illegal markets is one of the most common mechanisms for the acquisition of SALW. Five manners of diversion are particularly common: (1) the gray market – given that criminal actors and NSAGs are not easily controlled by national or international laws once they have weapons; (2) export licensing manipulations – especially forced documents such as end-user certificates; (3) theft from official government stockpiles – often involving inside assistance; (4) post-conflict collections of weapons from the battlefield – sort of a finders-keepers loophole; and (5) private individual weapons purchases through legal means for the illegal reselling to other actors.
• The role of arms brokers is fundamental in illegal arms transactions, and it is no easy role. It often involves intricate planning, deep pockets, and strong connections or networks. Further, the information required for these transfers is not easy to acquire given the necessarily covert nature of such illegal activity. Obviously since the market itself is illegal and exists underground, most nations have no way of regulating the activities of these brokers.
• Given their similarly complex requirements, illegal arms smuggling networks often overlap with other types of criminal networks. Marsh gives the example of the trade in conflict goods; but I can think of several other cases that might cross-apply – for instance, international drug trafficking. In fact, the overlapping economic interests in the illegal drug and arms markets are a recognized feature of many NSAGs including the Afghan Taliban as well as various Pakistani militant groups.

Part II of this review will offer some thoughts on Marsh’s policy recommendations. See you there…

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Some Useful South Asia Resources

As promised, below is an initial list of some useful resources specific to South Asia. I am certain that there is much more research to be discovered, so please add to my findings if you can. These are just some interesting starting pieces I have come across. Without further ado…

Some South Asia Specific Blogs & Online Sources:

• Control Arms Foundation of India (CAFI)
  • Link: CAFI
  • Comments: CAFI is a local NGO working towards diminishing the proliferation of and violence by small arms in the region. Since this blog focuses on South Asia, CAFI will be a good starting point to look at local initiatives, partnerships, efforts, and networks that are emerging. CAFI covers a wide range of issues in the Indian context, with relevant news updates and reports on India’s progress towards the Arms Trade Treaty as well as compliance with the UN Program of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons.

• Alliance for Peace and Disability Rights (APDR)
  • Link: APDR
  • Comments: APDR is an NGO registered to Pakistan (and the UK). One of its focus areas is disarmament, peace, and conflict prevention in Pakistan and its surrounding area. APDR serves as a valuable lens to look at local efforts in Pakistan, which seemingly has one of the worst cases of small arms proliferation to NSAGs – especially militant groups.

• Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU)
• Link: PSRU
• Comments: A research organization attached to the University of Bradford, PSRU serves more as a point of reference than an object of analysis. It provides links and reports relevant to the topic and is good for navigational purposes on this rather complex issue. While PSRU provides research on all aspects of Pakistan’s security, it does also have a section devoted specifically to small arms and light weapons with useful information.

• India Armed Violence Assessment (IAVA)
  • Link: IAVA
  • Comments: A research arm of The Graduate Institute in Geneva and the Small Arms Survey, IAVA is one of the only organizations conducting in-depth research on the causes and elements of all forms of armed violence in India. IAVA’s spectrum covers armed violence across several types of actors, including crime, militancy, terrorism, insurgency, separatism, social conflict, and even gender violence.

Some South Asia Specific Books & Reports:

• Banerjee, Dipankar and Robert Muggah. “Small Arms and Human Insecurity: Reviewing Participatory Research in South Asia.” Regional Centre for Strategic Studies. July 2002.
  • Link: Small Arms and Human Insecurity
  • Comments: This paper is a joint effort (by Small Arms Survey and the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies) to study the progress and potential of the movement against illegal small arms in South Asia. It uniquely explores local approaches and techniques and frames the issue as one of human insecurity from a “subjective” rather than “objective” standpoint – meaning that while it considers data and records, it does so for the ultimate purpose of assessing “the experience of people living in conflict zones and how the presence of small arms is conceived in relation to their personal security.”

• “India’s States of Armed Violence: Assessing the Human Cost and Political Priorities.” Small Arms Survey Issue Brief No.1. Small Arms Survey. September 2011.
  • Link: India’s States of Armed Violence
  • Comments: This brief concentrates on three particular problem areas within the larger armed violence issue in India: (1) insurgency; (2) terrorism; and (3) criminal violence. Each area is addressed through an assessment of trends and patterns as well as government action, spending, and policy. The brief emphasizes a lacking focus on the domestic side of the issue by the Indian government, which tends to emphasize international threats more greatly. Accordingly, the authors encourage greater attention on criminal elements, which leads to a large (and often understated) portion of India’s casualties.

• “India and the Arms Trade Treaty.” Oxfam Briefing Note. September 2006.
  • Link: India and the Arms Trade Treaty
  • Comments: This paper was published immediately prior to the October 2006 UN General Assembly – which was to focus heavily on the arms trade and the potential for an international Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Accordingly, the briefing advocates India’s participation and poses three chief reasons the ATT should be supported by India: (1) the ATT matches India’s own values and fits with India’s constitution; (2) the illegal arms trade is greatly harming India’s own citizens; and (3) the ATT would not hinder India’s legitimate arms production or trade, which remains one of the government’s main concerns.

• Malik, Salma and Mallika Joseph. Small Arms and the Security Debate in South Asia. Manohar Publishers: New Delhi, 2005.
  • Comments: Where much of the regional literature on small arms tends to focus on specific issues and occurrences of the problem, this book is one of the few to begin the discussion from a different perspective. It aims to situate the problem itself within the broader theoretical debate on security. The authors pose and attempt to address important questions that often get brushed over, particularly relating to why the small arms problem in South Asia is in fact a security threat. Moving beyond traditional assumptions that nation-building in South Asia will inherently be a violent process (as it was with the West as well), the authors attempt to look at the particular historical causes for this violent process in South Asia.

• Kartha, Tara. “Controlling the Black and Gray Markets in Small Arms in South Asia” in Light Weapons and Civil Conflict: Controlling the Tools of Violence. Eds. Jeffrey Boutwell and Michael T. Klare. Carnegie Corporation: New York, 1999.
  • Comments: This chapter points to the critical (but often ignored) distinction between the black and gray illegal arms markets in South Asia. Neither of these are new markets, but both have thrived in an unprecedented way due to the war in Afghanistan. While the black market is primarily profit-driven, the gray market is not. The latter “involves the machinery of the state in some form, notably where the government (or its agent) has either assisted in or turned a blind eye to illicit arms transfers originating from within its own territory or being organized by its national operating in other countries” (Boutwell and Klare, p. 51). This is a significant phenomenon in South Asia in light of states’ contributions to the arming of rebel, militant, or extremist groups – certainly a trend in India and Pakistan, but also in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.

Some South Asia Specific Articles & Speeches:

• Kapila, Subhash. “South Asia: Proliferation of Small Arms and its Impact on India’s Security.” Trancript. South Asia Analysis Group. March 2006.
  • Link: South Asia: Proliferation of Small Arms
  • Comments: Echoing Kofi Annan’s famous description of small arms as the real weapons of mass destruction, Kapila depicts South Asia as undisputable evidence of this reality. In a succinct and direct manner, he guides the audience through major observations and deductions on the region’s propensity for small arms proliferation before delving deeper into India’s particular challenges and vulnerabilities. It is all tied together with an analysis of the impact on India’s security – from strategic, political, economic, energy, and societal perspectives.

• Arputharaj, W. James. “The Crisis in South Asia.” Frontline Magazine. September 2001.
  • Link: The Crisis in South Asia
  • Comments: This brief article is useful for what it calls to attention. One important observation is that there is not enough regional cooperation to solve the issue of small arms proliferation in South Asia – unlike the more concerted efforts being made in Africa and Europe, for instance. The article also sets forth the characterization of India and Pakistan as suppliers as well as end-users of small arms, both legal and illegal. This may seem obvious, but it is interesting when the author contrasts these two countries with the others in South Asia – not all of which play the roles of both, broker and client.

• Sarwari, Bilal. “Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons.” Pakistan Law. 17 January 2010.
  • Link: Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons
  • Comments: This article looks at the small arms trade and manufacturing industry in Pakistan, breaking it down into three types of domestic producers: (1) the state-owned and public sector enterprise; (2) private manufacturers – which often operates under state license and regulation; and (3) the cottage industry – which escapes state supervision (including the Darra and Landi Kotal markets). The piece is useful for an initial understanding of how these three segments of the overall small arms market in Pakistan functions and who the key actors within it are.

• Gautam, Col. P.K. “Proliferation of Small Arms in South Asia and Human Security.” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies. 18 January 2003.
  • Link: Proliferation of Small Arms in South Asia
  • Comments: Though brief, this article points out quite a few useful considerations on the topic. It discusses the proliferation of small arms in South Asia in the context of three 21^st century trends: (1) most armed conflict has shifted from inter- to intra-state with the end of the 20^th century; (2) international disarmament efforts still tend to focus more on traditional weapons of mass destruction (especially nuclear ones) at the cost of offering sufficient attention to small arms – the main weapon used in such intrastate violence; and (3) civilians are now beginning to account for the highest percentage of casualties in small arms violence. The author argues that these factors should be a call to action for the international community.

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Background and Significance

When one thinks of the international arms trade, what generally comes to mind are the state-to-state transactions, the multinational companies, and the myriad treaties regulating an endless list of weapon types. What is often glanced over in this fleeting image is the underground international arms trade. This invisible part of the international arms market has gained as much from globalization as the legal weapons industry. For many buyers, it has provided a way to stay under the radar. More importantly, it has provided this with less hassle, less fees, less supervision, less regulation, and less accountability than the legal market – from economic, political, legal, and moral standpoints.

Non-state armed groups (NSAGs) have largely been the target customer as well as the prime broker of small arms sold on the black market. There is an irony in the fact that the suppliers and the demanders of small arms must often rely on each other as lifeblood. These mutually dependent actors may not, and often do not, share ideologies or beliefs; issues or grievances. Yet business underground, it turns out, is not too different from business above ground.

Since the end of the Cold War, more so than ever before, there has been a substantive and exponential rise in the illegal smuggling and trading of small arms. In the last two decades, there has been a correspondingly powerful (but perhaps not powerful enough) international movement to control small arms. This movement has grown into a transnational advocacy network with the involvement of the United Nations and international NGOs. Regional and local groups have also been critical to the exchange of information and the drawing of attention to the violence and casualties caused by small arms.

This blog will focus on efforts in South Asia, particularly in India and Pakistan. The reason for choosing this region is that it is one of the most deeply affected areas in the world when it comes to small arms proliferation and violence. Recently, there seems to be growing interest from international actors to address the problem here. This could be because the overall global campaign is itself broadening its reach. It could also be because the war in Afghanistan has forced the world to witness the reality of small arms violence in the region.  Pakistan and India are geospatially fated to the causes and effects at play here. Needless to say, these two countries are also entangled in their own messy relationship – one that emphatically fuels small arms violence in the region.

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