Devil’s Bargain: The Documentary

I seem to be a bit behind the times, but I’m catching up quickly (so don’t spend all night worrying). Here is a 2009 documentary I just came across called Devil’s Bargain. It appears in 6 parts on YouTube, all of which are embedded below. (You’re welcome.) While I have not yet had the time to complete the entire film, I hope to do so over the next few days. I will eventually get to posting my over-detailed analysis, as usual. Meanwhile, please do share your thoughts below. I’ll face the consequences of being a bit late on this discovery and accept any spoiler alerts that are thrown my way.

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Some Additional Thoughts on Deadly Women

As a brief follow-up to my previous post on Women and Illegal Arms Violence: Victims or Perpetrators? I highly recommend reading a one-year old analysis: Female Perpetrators of Violence: The Case of Dr. Aafia Siddiqui. The analyst, Haresh Mohanan, does a great job of outlining conventional wisdom and its fatal implications when it comes to women’s role in what I called extra-domestic or organized violence. My emphasis, again, is on women’s growing role as perpetrators, as well as the stereotypes that preclude such an expectation. Mohanan articulates this far better than I can:

“In the field of security studies, there is widespread skepticism of women as perpetrators of violence and as a result their acts of violence are often overlooked and marginalized. The denial of women’s agency in committing violence is detrimental, and will, ultimately, propel the security spectrum of the international system into disarray.

The portrayal of power and violence as generally masculine traits fuels the denial of women’s agency. This leads to a lack of coverage and documentation of information on female perpetrators of violence.”

It also seems that when women’s agency and role in choosing violence is in fact considered, it is framed in sexual contexts. Women, the thinking goes, only engage in such acts when they are involved (by marriage, sex, or family ties) with violent male perpetrators. The phenomenon has been closely examined in the context of terrorism, but is thought to extend to all sorts of organized violence. Mohanan and a few of his cited experts are observant enough to catch on to the counterproductive effects of such limited and narrow stereotypes.

This is where Aafia comes into the picture. Her story is one that defies so many layers of stereotypes about women and terrorist violence. She was clearly strong-minded and mentally sane. She was not evidently married to a terrorist. She was a woman with children’s lives on the line. She was highly educated, with a Ph.D. from MIT in the United States. She was voluntarily a fundraiser and activist for extremist Islamist terrorism. She was brave and daring. And she has become somewhat of a heroine and martyr in the eyes of so many Pakistanis.

Could this spawn even greater female activism for extremist causes? Could imagining such murderous women as heroines undermine all the strides made by Mukhtar Mai and other true heroines?

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Women and Illegal Arms Violence: Victims or Perpetrators?

Given the sheer number of illegal weapons in South Asia and the widespread indiscriminate casualties compliments of this illegal proliferation, I do not often stop to think of the isolated impact on women or the gender implications. A fascinating analysis calls this issue to mind: Armed Societies, Another Tragedy for Women. Interestingly, the article juxtaposes the impact of illegal arms proliferation on women in three very different conflict regions: Venezuela, Mexico, and Pakistan. The analyst, Humberto Marquez, breaks down the problem in simple terms: In Venezuela, it emerges from the general proliferation of violent crime and police corruption – though this, of course, is not unique to Venezuela alone. In Mexico, it is fueled by drug culture and the predominance of cartels. In Pakistan, (as frequently discussed on this blog), it arises from a complex mix of violent militancy and extremism, insurgency and terrorism, and also corruption and imbalance. Marquez, however, oversimplifies the context in Pakistan to “a hotbed of political and religious struggles,” but clearly it is so much more.

What stands out are less the differences of these country contexts, however, and more their similarities. In Venezuela, the threat of violence by illegal weapons continues to grow “in the lowest-income and least educated segments of the population.” The same can easily be said about Pakistan and (I suspect) also other conflict-ridden areas of the world. Additionally, it is not just in Venezuela that the likelihood of women reporting domestic violence is linked to cultural interpretations of shame and honor. South Asian culture, however different in India and Pakistan, is known to emphasize the duty of honor on women.

In both countries, women have become the sacrificial victims of unbelievably crass honor crimes. Think of India’s archaic practice of sati: self-immolation for widows of the deceased. It was declared illegal in the early 1800s, but continues to be practiced in remote parts of the country where tribal culture still precedes national culture. In Pakistan, honor killings and suicides also remain common practice. Think of Mukhtar Mai – the brave woman who refused to commit suicide, as she was expected to do, after being forcefully raped by members of a neighboring tribe. Though one certainly cannot claim the natural element of fire to be an illegal weapon, the point of both these examples is the burden on women to carry forward tribal or familial honor. This same thinking could very well be behind the use of more modern weapons against women.

Marquez claims that the proliferation and use of illegal weapons for violence against women is a result of perceptions of masculinity – which, according to some, is more closely linked to the use of weapons than is the feminine image. For Marquez,

“In parts of the world where political and religious battles are waged with guns, like Pakistan, ‘the increasing gun culture has put the entire society on a razor’s edge, particularly the women at the receiving end.”

While I realize this may be factually evident throughout the history of war and violence across various cultures globally, it does not sit right with me. (Separately, it is worth mentioning that some studies find women to be equally likely perpetrators of domestic abuse, at least in Western cultures. For more background, start with these studies from the University of Florida, the American Psychological Association, or PubMed.) I would distinguish domestic violence from what I will call extra-domestic or organized violence. At the very least, I do not think it is prudent to limit perceptions of women to the receiving end of violence and overlook the role they have come to play in the proliferation of extra-domestic violence today. In general, I have not come across very many studies on women and illegal weapons – the latter being such a blurry topic to accurately report on in the first place. We do, however, see a rising role for women in more and more organized violence. Though this very well may not be the case in instances of domestic violence, its implications are hugely important. Terrorist cells are increasingly turning to women, for instance, because they supposedly attract less attention and suspicion since they do not fit the stereotype. This is exactly what I mean. Stereotypes about gender are not always helpful and can even be counterproductive in threat recognition, at least in organized violence. Remember LTTE’s women cadres. Remember the Black Widows. Remember Jihad Jane. Remember Dr. Aafia Siddiqui. While there remains much to be done on the problem of domestic violence and the role of illegal weapons in amplifying that problem, perhaps it is best not to generalize women’s role in violence in all spheres. In terms of organized violence, the unexpected can often be an advantage to perpetrators. And women, sadly, are not quite the saints (incapable of harm) that I grew up being told they were.

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Weapons Stockpiles as Assets and Private Armies as Normal?

Digging a bit deeper (on the issue of my last post), I discovered a great explanation of an often-overlooked aspect of Pakistan’s gun proliferation problem a few days ago in The News (a Pakistani newspaper). Despite knowing of the widespread militancy unfortunately spreading in Pakistan, it is hard to accept that nearly 500 private armies are freely operating within the territory. These are not terrorist groups. They are not insurgents. And nor are they state forces (officially speaking). They are literally small gangs that are individually operated by the country’s elites. To say these private armies are ‘well-equipped’ would be an understatement. Reportedly, some even have anti-aircraft guns and rocket launchers – off-the-record, one would presume. In many cases, however, their weaponization is acknowledged with formal licenses – acknowledged, but not condemned. For the Pakistani resident and reporter Naeem Sadiq, “De facto, this is endorsement of the existence of a small group of powerful and influential people licensed to use violence to control lesser beings.” No wonder so many so-called ‘lesser beings’ (which needless to say, they are not) are driven to sleeping with unlicensed  guns under their beds, just in case. (See previous post: Guns Galore; Solutions Scarce.)

The small armies are not limited to the protection of the individual elites they are loyal too, nonetheless. These private armies are doing public harm, in effect with the tacit approval of the state. They kill and pillage; rape and murder. Far from a minor problem, “the lives and properties of citizens thus become hostage to state-licensed warlords.” One more violent group to fear – just what every ordinary Pakistani really needs.

All this continues with the blessings of the Pakistan Arms Ordinance of 1965, which supposedly creates loopholes that allow elites to acquire hundreds of weapons licenses to distribute as they please. Imagine my oh-so-unexpected surprise when I learned that these elites often issue all their allotted licenses to themselves! The Ordinance is criticized for being both discriminatory and arbitrary:

“The Arms Ordinance is nothing but a discretionary instrument of political bribery, appeasement and violence. When the members of the government grant arms licenses to their own cronies, the state itself triggers an arms race and forces those less influential and rich to acquire weapons illegally in order to maintain a balance of weaponization. By permitting invariably incompetent and corrupt state officials to grant arms licenses on a mass scale, the Pakistan Arms Ordinance has become a root cause of the arming of militant urban and feudal warlords.”

So again, violence begets more violence, especially in unstable conflict environments. Pakistan is already facing a multi-dimensional internal security crisis. Does the state need to facilitate – and must the people suffer – the corrupt arming of already powerful elites?

Sadiq suggests repelling the Arms Ordinance and beginning programs of de-weaponization throughout the country, beginning at its epicenter in Karachi. This is a worthy ideal to hold onto, but I suspect it may be a tiny bit off-center from reality. Solutions cannot simply ride the winds of idealism; unfortunately they must also be tied to the windproof counterweight of realism. Let’s start with stopping the licensing games…

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Guns Galore, Solutions Scarce

The Pakistan Muslim League (a political party) caught my eye the other day with an intriguing post on Guns Galore on their blog. Moving beyond my confused expression upon discovery of such a blog, I found the post surprisingly candid. I do not know how reliable its claims are or what its internal or public sources might be. However, I will be generous for a moment and give them the benefit of the doubt (but read quickly; this may literally only last a moment). If there is any validity to these statistics, the problem is even more rampant than imagined. A few lines particularly jumped out at me:

We have laws to regulate gun ownership and usage but they are widely flouted, and anybody who really wants a gun and has the money and contacts can be armed and dangerous within hours – minutes in some areas. Our elected representatives to federal and provincial assemblies all have a “quota” of firearms licences that they can issue to favoured constituents, and there are any number of “security guards” who tote a range of weaponry with an indifferent set of skills when it comes to usage. Add to this the millions of weapons that are in private hands, unlicensed and undeclared but lying under beds or in cupboards against domestic intrusion or just to keep handy in case of trouble, and you have a population that is armed out of all proportion to the need to physically protect itself. The recent case of “mis-declaration” is one of a chain stretching back years, has the connivance of “influentials” and corrupt customs officials and is unlikely to be broken by any half-hearted “investigation”.

What is surprising about this besides the colorful language? The accelerating speed of acquisition. The existence and admittance of a quota system. The trend of unlicensed private ownership (assumed here to refer to non-combatants and non-militants) despite the provisions for legal ownership. And not least of all, the acknowledgement of a population that “is armed out of all proportion to the need to physically protect itself.” If these are recognized problems, where are the efforts to address them? What am I missing here? Violence begets more violence and for many in India and Pakistan, escaping the vicious cycle is implausible or impossible if it dares to threaten their survival. The governments complain about insecurities arising from their neighbors (ie, each other) and yet it is the inability of these governments to effectively cut this cycle that actually further solidifies it for locals in far off villages. If the government cannot assure your security on a general level, if you have to answer to violent actors with nowhere else to go, if you are driven to acquire illegal guns just in case… Well what is the answer then?

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India’s Insurgency: (Illegally) Armed and Dangerous

Recently, there has been a lot of media coverage on India’s Maoist insurgency. For years the Indo-China border was considered part of India’s dual threat (in addition, to the Indo-Pak border). India’s defense thinking very much accounts for the possibility of a two-front war – a simultaneous state-to-state conflict on two borders at once, or worse, two enemies acting as one. Today, some fear mongering still exists but the threat of an all-out war on either border seems less likely. Instead, the real security crisis for India today originates from an insurgent problem in both regions – one external; the other internal.

The internal insurgency is waged by Naxalites (also known as Maoists) and is spreading like wildfire from India’s Northeastern region to the rest of the country.[1] The term Naxalite covers several communist militant groups in different parts of India. They generally follow a Maoist interpretation of radical communist ideology (hence their more familiar label: ‘Maoists’). Often, however, they are more fundamentally tied to economic gains than to their ideological preachings. The Naxal movement originated in West Bengal in 1967 and has been an ever-increasing problem. For the last few years, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has again and again described the Maoists as India’s gravest internal threat.[2] Like most other insurgent movements, the Maoists claim to be fighting for the people. And also like most other insurgent movements, they ignore the hypocrisy of abusing, attacking, or killing their own in the process. As the insurgency grows, it seems, so does its violence.[3]

In India, arms trafficking is now both a cause and an effect of the spreading Maoist insurgency. The movement has both been assisted by other actors as well as itself facilitated a great deal of armed violence in the region. Sri Lanka’s infamous terrorist organization, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), is closely allied with India’s Maoist movement. For years, there have been reports of LTTE funneling illicit arms to the Maoists – and the latter have often returned the favor. Another suspected provider is the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA). And a third source for illegal weapons is suspected to be China.[4]

Though New Delhi appears to have some interesting strategies for dealing with the Maoists directly, it must also continue dealing with their dangerous affiliates.[5] When focusing on these partners in crime, policymakers should be careful to frame the Maoists’ escalating violence and emerging alliances in the context of India’s exploding illicit arms trade. To be sure, New Delhi cannot afford to underestimate the implications of the Maoists’ growing cross-border terrorist links. Equally significant, nonetheless, is the potential China connection. First, the sheer power of a state-supported insurgency could devastate parts of India – especially in providing access to resources that non-state actors often do not enjoy. Second, China in particular is the world’s cheapest producer of small arms and thus, makes their acquisition very easy even if that is all it does. Third, the age-old Indo-China tensions cannot be overlooked as a factor – at the very least, as possible motive to aid the Maoists covertly if not back them openly. Fourth, this would not be China’s first instance of gray market or black market transfers to illicit actors.[6] Think Zimbabwe. Think Sudan. Think Burma and Nepal (among a host of other conflict-ridden nations around the world).[7]

Peace comes at a price and India is paying it. Despite years of collecting evidence on China’s role as supplier, India is choosing to downplay the issue. They could have come from anywhere – even if they are Chinese-made weapons – is the generous assumption. (This could very well be a strategic move in light of recent baby-steps with Beijing.[8]) For instance, New Delhi’s official position is to delink evidence of Chinese weapons found with Indian insurgents (especially Maoists) from assumptions of China’s direct involvement. Ministry of External Affairs spokesman Vishnu Prakash two weeks ago confirmed that the insurgent issue would remain on Prime Minister Singh’s agenda for discussion with the Chinese representative at last week’s ASEAN Summit in Bali. Having said that, he followed by emphasizing the lack of any hard evidence clearly proving Chinese support to India’s insurgents: “All militant outfits including the Maoists would like us to believe that they have China’s support, but we are yet to see a smoking gun.”[9] I understand the immeasurable value of potential progress with Beijing. And I understand why New Delhi is working so hard not to jeopardize even small breakthroughs. Note that India and China are getting closer to jointly addressing the border security issues that plague them both – no small victory at all. Nonetheless, while it may be a strategic move to tone down accusations of China’s potential role in fueling the Maoists and other groups, I wonder if this un-negotiated price for peace is at all fair for those innocents caught in the crossfire. Moreover, can a sound and sustainable security agreement truly form where one country turns a blind eye to the other’s potential role in contributing to its insecurity? I sense commitment phobia on one side and denial on the other. Someone call a therapist.

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[1] For those interested in more background on the Maoist insurgency itself, here are a few good quick reads:

• “Profile: India’s Maoist Rebels.” BBC News. 4 March 2011.
• “How Big is the Maoist Threat in India?” Reuters. 6 April 2010.
• “India’s Maoist Threat: ‘State Power’ Versus State Malaise.” South Asia Masala. 8 June 2010.
• “Maoist Armed Conflict – More than Insurgency.” Times of Assam. 12 November 2011.

[2] See, for instance:

• “Insurgency in India – How the Maoist Threat Reaches Beyond Nepal.” The Financial Times. 26 April 2006.
• “PM Threat No. 1 Tag on Maoists.” The Telegraph India. 14 April 2006.
• “Understanding the Maoist Threat.” Rediff India. 8 February 2007.
• “India Losing Against Maoists: Manmohan.” Frontline Pakistan. 15 September 2009.
• “The Red Heart of India.” The Economist. 5 November 2009.
• “Naxalism Gravest Internal Security Threat to Nation: PM.” The Indian Express. 21 April 2010.

[3] A closer look at a few resources makes this point evident:

• “Maoist Attacks in India: Timeline.” The Telegraph. 28 May 2010.
• “India – Maoist Insurgency.” Project Ploughshares. February 2011.
• “Maoist Attacks in India.” India60. Undated.
  • Specifically, see the Status of Fighting and Number of Deaths subsections.

[4] For more detailed information on these and other connections, see:

• “Indian Maoists Have Ties with Other Terror Groups.” Boloji.com. 14 September 2008.
• “LTTE Training Maoists Cadre?” The Times of India. 26 October 2009.
• “Naxalite: International Connections.” Headlines India. Undated.
• “Chinese Arms Agents Smuggle Weapons Into India.” Outlook India. 11 April 2011.
• “India Probes Maoists’ Foreign Links.” Asia Times. 11 November 2009.

[5] Here are a couple of pieces detailing particular aspects of New Delhi’s treatment of and approach to the Naxalite problem:

• “Maoist-Hit Areas Should Share India’s Growth, Says Manmohan Singh.” The Times of India. 13 September 2011.
• “PM Announces New Policy to Tackle Naxal Menace in India.” OneIndia News. 13 September 2011.
• “India’s Approach to Counterinsurgency and the Naxalite Problem.” CTC Sentinel. 31 October 2011.
• “Steps Being Taken to Check Maoist Activities in Northeast by Govt.” DNA India. 2 November 2011.

[6] “Global Insights: Chinese Arms Sales Worry Washington.” World Politics Review. 17 March 2009.

• Also see the links provided for the following three notes.

[7] For just a few of the many examples of China’s involvement in illicit arms transfers fueling armed conflict, see:

• “Govern Global Arms Trade.” Control Arms Foundation of India. 12 May 2008.
• “China: Recall Arms Shipment Headed for Zimbabwe.” Human Rights Watch. 22 April 2008.
• “China Supplying Small Arms to Zimbabwe.” DefenceWeb. 14 November 2011.
• “Rearming Zimbabwe’s Security Forces.” Southern Africa Report. 10 November 2011.
• “China Arms Sales ‘Fuel Conflicts’.” BBC News. 12 June 2006.
• “Arms Trade Fuels Violations in Sudan Conflict.” Amnesty International. 8 July 2011.
• “People’s Republic of China: Sustaining Conflict and Human Rights Abuses – The Flow of Arms Accelerates.” Amnesty International. June 2006.
• “China: Secretive Arms Exports Stoking Conflict and Repression.” Amnesty International. 11 June 2006.

[8] Potential progress is reflected in current reporting on Indo-China diplomatic talks:

• “China Welcomes Manmohan’s Statement on Border Issue.” The Hindu. 25 October 2011.
• “India-China Border Pact This Month.” The Indian Express. 11 November 2011.
• “Proposed Indo-China Agreements Aimed at Fixing Common Agenda.” IBN Live India. 21 November 2011.
• “India, China Seek to Defuse Tension.” The Assam Tribune. 18 November 2011.

[9] “India, China Close to Agreement.” The Assam Tribune. 17 November 2011.

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Small Arms Mass Destruction

I posted a useful visual on twitter and thought I should share the same here. So below is a Small Arms Mass Destruction chart, part of the PBS series on Women, War & Peace. Synthesizing some of the bigger picture facts about small arms, the chart looks at common weapon types, civilian versus military ownership, the illicit flow of arms, and small arms casualties globally. Below the image, I share a couple of thoughts and reactions.

• The flow of illicit arms section made me wonder if there is any project globally tracking hot zones for diversion, theft, or illicit transferring of small arms. The example given focuses on Sudan, and there are other known hot zones in Africa and across the globe. It would be fascinating to see where in the world arms smugglers mark their comfort zones. It would seem natural if the patterns emerging from such a global flow study ended up pointing to states rampant with corruption, states lacking infrastructure, and states with the weakest policing and law enforcement but it would be worth finding out if such hypotheses are backed by the data. Such a study would also be useful in understanding the global pattern because flow direction can often indicate origin and destination – which can be crucial to uprooting or terminating the illegal arms trade (if I can momentarily lapse into optimism). The challenge, of course, is information itself – its accessibility; its availability; its quality. (Black market data may not exactly be the easiest to crowdsource, after all.)
• I was highly surprised that after the U.S., Yemen had the highest firearm to population ratio – an astounding 5.9 guns to every 10 residents. Keep in mind though, this may not translate to 59% of the population being armed. It may, of course. But, more likely, those that are armed are in possession of multiple weapons. Also keep in mind the three violent groups in Yemen: the Houthi rebels, the Southern secessionists, and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). These groups certainly add fuel to the fire; the end result being armed violence – regardless of whether local individuals and tribes are taking up arms for or against their causes.
• As a sidenote, the chart does not specify but I believe the ownership statistics are based on registered firearms since it is nearly impossible to count illegal arms (especially in conflict zones). If this is true, Yemen’s 5.9/10 ratio is even more jarring. Who knows what else is out there…
• Final point: the global epidemic map made me pause to rethink some of my assumptions. Though it is limited to the 2004-09 period, I was struck by Afghanistan’s categorization in the middle of the death rate scale. According to this data, in Afghanistan an average of 10-20 of every 100,000 people died from small arms violence in Afghanistan (and that too, for five years before the 2009 U.S. troop surge). This number, unfortunately, seems a low estimate at best.
• Overall, the rest of the global picture makes more sense from region to region. Western countries and Southern parts of Latin America see the least deaths from small arms violence. The usual suspects such as Colombia and Sudan end up with some of the highest number of small arms casualties. That Guatemala and South Africa ranked in the highest category of death rates was, however, a bit surprising for me. I suppose media reporting bias affects all of our perceptions to some extent…

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Two Sides of the Same Coin – Part II

This post will be a continuation of comments on the following journal article:

Marsh, Nicholas. “Two Sides of the Same Coin? The Legal and Illegal Trade in Small Arms.” The Brown Journal of World Affairs. Spring 2002.

As I discussed in my previous post Two Sides of the Same Coin – Part I Marsh delivers a good overall outline of the key issues in the legal and illegal arms trade. Having extracted and commented on some of his useful observations, I now offer some thoughts on his concluding recommendations:

Two valuable and under-represented recommendations presented relate to the need for greater domestic legislation around the globe, and connectedly, the need for greater domestic transparency – especially in regulations, tracking, and oversight of a government’s own exports. These are principled suggestions assuming that the government in question has nothing to hide and is willing to audit itself. The willingness of governments to monitor themselves is vital here as the international community does not seem currently capable of erecting an IAEA-type organization to govern arms transfers. Even if this was a possibility, tracking the illegal arms trade is much more nuanced than tracking illegal nuclear activity. Among other complexities, the illegal arms trade is simultaneously a much more widespread and a much more concealable problem.

The two other policy recommendations provided are less helpful. The first is to sign the UN firearms treaty. Keep in mind this paper was written in 2002 and there have since been several arms control efforts at the UN and other international or regional organizations. For instance, the present focus falls on the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). However, whether governments choose to sign such treaties or not does not depend on a white paper recommendation unfortunately. It depends on a host of other factors, not least of which are material incentives such as profits as well as domestic political will.

The other recommendation that I dismiss is for governments to stop partaking in gray market activity, especially since it often spills over into the black market. Again, this is not something that a mere recommendation will change. Alternatives have to be provided to incentivize legitimate actors to walk away from years of established networks and profits in illegitimate activities such as trafficking. Additionally, this seems the most unrealistic of the four recommendations. While it should certainly remain an ideal of the arms control movement, it is unlikely to be a near-term reality. Governments that engage in gray market arms sales and transfers (including the United States), do so knowingly and willingly. It is a conscious decision, and though in some cases it may be a desperate measure, it is likely not a decision made haphazardly or whimsically. Clearly then, something about the risk-reward calculus encourages these participant governments and legal entities to go gray. So it would follow, then, that changing their ways will require more than a wag of the finger; would it not?

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Two Sides of the Same Coin – Part I

This post and the next one will be a two part reaction to one of the journal pieces listed in my earlier post on useful general resources:

Marsh, Nicholas. “Two Sides of the Same Coin? The Legal and Illegal Trade in Small Arms.” The Brown Journal of World Affairs. Spring 2002.

Nicholas Marsh and his team at the Norwegian Initiative for Small Arms Transfers (NISAT) contextualize illegal arms transfers by first presenting an overview of the mechanics of legal transfers. My intent is not to summarize the article, but to present a few synthesized observations that (while not all new) are worth noting:

• There are no legally binding international conventions or treaties to govern legal arms transfers. Transfers are currently based on national legislation – which obviously causes a great deal of irregularity.
• International law only interferes with legal arms transfers when one of the parties involved is under a recognized arms embargo – usually initiated by a regional or intergovernmental organization (IGO).
• In some ways it is easier to exert international control or oversight over weapons of mass destruction (WMD) transfers than those involving small arms and light weapons (SALW). There are IGOs and regional entities that have built in jurisdiction to get involved on the former issue since it is often perceived as a graver threat (even though the destruction caused by SALW is often worse). In contrast, there is no such organization with jurisdictional or regulatory power over small arms transfers. These must be self-regulated by the countries importing and exporting such weapons. Worse yet, most governments lack national legislation prohibiting sales or exports to particular kinds of regimes.
  • Attempts to fill this gap have been made. Of the many failed examples, one stands out as slightly better: the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. Despite its workable framework, Marsh and other experts have often described the EU Code simply as ‘well-intentioned legislative feebleness’” (Marsh, p.220).
• Existing estimates of the illegal arms trade are wide-ranging due to the immeasurable nature of the problem. The range spans from 10-20% to over 50% of the legal arms market. Marsh believes the lower end of the range is more likely accurate.
• Often times, the same illicit weapons in the hands of illegal actors today were originally produced and sold by legal means. Basic economics explain the diminishing value of these second-hand weapons with their repeated circulation. Though Marsh does not go down this route, it occurs to me that this could even serve to incentivize legal forces (national governments and militaries) to employ illegal weapons instead of their more expensive legally acquired counterparts.
• As is commonly understood, the illegal arms trade can be bifurcated to a black and gray market. The former exist beyond international or governmental control or awareness; whereas the latter exist with their participation or tacit approval.
  • The gray market peaked during the Cold War with all its proxy wars and competitive security. Under enemy-of-my-enemy thinking, both superpowers armed other national and non-state actors to undermine each others’ spheres of influence. A stark example is the U.S. (and Saudi Arabian) arming of mujahideen in Afghanistan and Pakistan to fight the 1980s anti-Soviet resistance. In just ten years, the U.S. alone spent over $2 billion on arming the Taliban and other non-state armed groups (NSAGs). How damaging is the gray market? Take a look at the aftermath of this single episode in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region two-decades later.
  • Post-Cold War era gray market transfers have not slowed down. Examples of illicit gray market activity frequently involve the U.S., Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. The recipients of gray market transfers as well as their ill-fated victims are often civilians in these last three regions.
  • The black market, on the other hand, is literally like a black hole. Transfers are generally conducted by private individuals, NSAGs, and other criminal entities – making them nearly impossible to track. Why so much demand for SALW? Well, if continued human conflict and competition is not a sufficient explanation, then perhaps practicality will be. As Marsh so accurately describes: “Small arms are lightweight, easy to conceal, can be used immediately by the purchaser, and can be recycled around the world’s conflicts” (Marsh, 223). These same features make SALW extremely attractive to end-users and smugglers alike.
  • Perhaps one of the most salient observations Marsh poses – one that is cited here and there in other papers on the topic, but too often goes unmentioned – is that after SALW “have entered the black market, they are effectively beyond government control and can be re-exported to other illegal clients throughout the weapon’s lifetime” (Marsh, 223). In other words, there can be no recalls or reversal mechanisms with this type of illegal activity.
  • The illegal market (especially the black market) is fueled by the loopholes and resulting ease of accessibility to weapons within the legal market. Diversion of weapons from the legal to illegal markets is one of the most common mechanisms for the acquisition of SALW. Five manners of diversion are particularly common: (1) the gray market – given that criminal actors and NSAGs are not easily controlled by national or international laws once they have weapons; (2) export licensing manipulations – especially forced documents such as end-user certificates; (3) theft from official government stockpiles – often involving inside assistance; (4) post-conflict collections of weapons from the battlefield – sort of a finders-keepers loophole; and (5) private individual weapons purchases through legal means for the illegal reselling to other actors.
• The role of arms brokers is fundamental in illegal arms transactions, and it is no easy role. It often involves intricate planning, deep pockets, and strong connections or networks. Further, the information required for these transfers is not easy to acquire given the necessarily covert nature of such illegal activity. Obviously since the market itself is illegal and exists underground, most nations have no way of regulating the activities of these brokers.
• Given their similarly complex requirements, illegal arms smuggling networks often overlap with other types of criminal networks. Marsh gives the example of the trade in conflict goods; but I can think of several other cases that might cross-apply – for instance, international drug trafficking. In fact, the overlapping economic interests in the illegal drug and arms markets are a recognized feature of many NSAGs including the Afghan Taliban as well as various Pakistani militant groups.

Part II of this review will offer some thoughts on Marsh’s policy recommendations. See you there…

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A Not-So-Comical Comic Strip

In its 2008 report, the Small Arms Survey included a descriptive comic strip – less comical and more serious than the term would imply. I am including the comic here because the visualization is not far-removed from real life black market transactions in the arms trade. The narrative of the comic is quite telling of reality and depicts the unfortunate ease and casualness with which smugglers often conduct their illegal business. But I can say little that the images themselves do not already communicate, so here it is…

© Small Arms Survey 2008

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Old News That Remains New (II)

In January of this year, The Guardian published a useful brief Licensed to Kill? How Gun Laws Vary Around the World. The brief presents a two-line summary of gun laws in 16 countries around the world. Since it is so short, I am including the entire text of the brief below.

Australia: Ownership is strictly prohibited unless there are “genuine reasons” such as licensed sport, animal control or employment requirements.

Brazil: If you are over 25 and have registered a weapon, you are free to keep it indoors. The country has the second-highest gun-related death rate after the US.

Canada:  Significantly stricter than the neighbouring US. To acquire a licence, applicants must undertake a safety course, pass a criminal records check and be certified by a firearms officer.

China: Civilians are not allowed guns, except for hunting and protection from wildlife. The illegal sale of arms can be punished by death sentence.

India: Gun ownership is a “privilege” under the Arms Act of 1959, allowing civilians to have a licence if they can prove that there is a “threat to life”.

Czech Republic: Liberal laws compared with the rest of Europe. Applicants must pass a questionnaire on firearms, have no criminal record and show ID proving they are over 21.

Austria: Also liberal. Guns are classified by four categories – the lowest, for non-repeating shotguns, requires no registration for over-18s.

Germany: The Federal Weapons Act (1972) restricts everything apart from replica guns to over-18s, who must pass checks for “trustworthiness, knowledge and adequacy”.

Italy: Citizens can have up to three “common” handguns in their home, but if they want to hunt or carry a concealed weapon they must apply for a licence.

Japan: Licensing requirements are strict and gun deaths are among the lowest in the world.

Mexico: Strict laws apply for ownership, including criminal records checks. However, there are growing concerns that smuggling from the US is undermining these regulations.

Norway: Since 1989, no registration has been required for buying a shotgun over the counter. There are an estimated 500,000 unregistered guns in homes. However, gun crime is very low.

Russia: Hand guns and fully automatics are prohibited, but over-18s with no criminal record can apply for a licence for shotguns and air rifles. Self defence is not an excuse for carrying firearms outside the home.

Switzerland: All able-bodied men between 20 and 34 are required to have fully automatic firearms in their homes in case of a call-up to the army under the doctrine of “universal conscription”. Others may own weapons for hunting but need a licence. A referendum is to be held next year to determine whether stricter gun laws should be introduced.

UK: Anyone sentencved to three years or more in prison is banned from holding a licence. A licence is needed for any firearm except low-powered air rifles/pistols. Self-defence is not a valid reason for ownership. The country has one of the world’s lowest gun crime rates.

USA: Fully automatic firearms are legal in most states. However, you need a criminal records check and must pay $200 registration tax. In 2004, there were 29,569 gun-related deaths, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

© 2011 Guardian News and Media Limited or its affiliated companies. All rights reserved.

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Old News That Remains New (I)

Over the next few posts – and every now and then – I will be digging through news archives and posting some interesting pieces. Some of these will go back a couple of years and some will go back a few months. Nonetheless, these pieces have proven their continued relevance and are being posted to contextualize current trends and events. I hope readers will find these as worthy of attention as I do. Let’s begin with a 2009 piece on the Taliban’s acquisition of small arms…

 

 

In September 2009, Danger Room reported that the Taliban Seeks Rifles with More ‘Punch’. Danger Room’s reporting was based on Ghaith Abdul-Ahad’s article in The Guardian: Trade in Guns & Drugs that Fuels War in Afghanistan. Abdul-Ahad sat down with Hekmat, an ordinary local shop-owner who made his real fortunes as a drug and weapons smuggler (compliments of the ongoing war in Afghanistan).

According to Hekmat, a monthly supply of $20,000 in weapons easily gets him $5,000 in profits. That’s a 25% profit margin on a monthly basis – no small amount for a villager in a country ripped to poverty over decades. And the majority of money does not come from the most common weapon, the AK-47 – the traditional Kalashnikov. These are actually one of the cheapest and most easily acquired (especially from the Chinese), costing a mere $400 a piece – perhaps explaining their decades of popularity among Taliban foot soldiers.

The higher profits come from the Kalakov, essentially a modernized AK-47 with smaller bullets and a lighter frame. Why the update? Hekmat observes that the Taliban now prefer the Kalakov because of its ability to pierce body armor. They are acquired for $700 and sold for $1,100 by sellers like Hekmat. One can discern the increasing demand in the increased sale price in a single year – they used to sell at $700 in Afghanistan.

The destruction of war is not so destructive for Afghans behind the illegal arms trade. Hekmat has no shame in declaring, “Yes, war is very good for business.” The police are no obstacle to this growing market either: “They take their cut. The border police chief is a smuggler himself, and no one can do smuggling without his knowledge.” It doesn’t seem far-fetched, then, for Abdul-Ahad to conclude that the real dangers of smuggling were in not being well-connected.

The lessons here are not trivial. With a better understanding of smugglers’ cost-benefit analysis, international efforts may find better approaches to disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs in Afghanistan. From a smuggler’s perspective, perhaps the risks and dangers of trafficking are entirely worth the profits and sustenance it can lead to. If that is true, then changing this cost-benefit calculus will be key for addressing the problem. And needless to say, better solutions to the problem of arms smuggling in Afghanistan will greatly affect the entire illegal arms trade in South Asia, especially in Pakistan.

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Some Useful South Asia Resources

As promised, below is an initial list of some useful resources specific to South Asia. I am certain that there is much more research to be discovered, so please add to my findings if you can. These are just some interesting starting pieces I have come across. Without further ado…

Some South Asia Specific Blogs & Online Sources:

• Control Arms Foundation of India (CAFI)
  • Link: CAFI
  • Comments: CAFI is a local NGO working towards diminishing the proliferation of and violence by small arms in the region. Since this blog focuses on South Asia, CAFI will be a good starting point to look at local initiatives, partnerships, efforts, and networks that are emerging. CAFI covers a wide range of issues in the Indian context, with relevant news updates and reports on India’s progress towards the Arms Trade Treaty as well as compliance with the UN Program of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons.

• Alliance for Peace and Disability Rights (APDR)
  • Link: APDR
  • Comments: APDR is an NGO registered to Pakistan (and the UK). One of its focus areas is disarmament, peace, and conflict prevention in Pakistan and its surrounding area. APDR serves as a valuable lens to look at local efforts in Pakistan, which seemingly has one of the worst cases of small arms proliferation to NSAGs – especially militant groups.

• Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU)
• Link: PSRU
• Comments: A research organization attached to the University of Bradford, PSRU serves more as a point of reference than an object of analysis. It provides links and reports relevant to the topic and is good for navigational purposes on this rather complex issue. While PSRU provides research on all aspects of Pakistan’s security, it does also have a section devoted specifically to small arms and light weapons with useful information.

• India Armed Violence Assessment (IAVA)
  • Link: IAVA
  • Comments: A research arm of The Graduate Institute in Geneva and the Small Arms Survey, IAVA is one of the only organizations conducting in-depth research on the causes and elements of all forms of armed violence in India. IAVA’s spectrum covers armed violence across several types of actors, including crime, militancy, terrorism, insurgency, separatism, social conflict, and even gender violence.

Some South Asia Specific Books & Reports:

• Banerjee, Dipankar and Robert Muggah. “Small Arms and Human Insecurity: Reviewing Participatory Research in South Asia.” Regional Centre for Strategic Studies. July 2002.
  • Link: Small Arms and Human Insecurity
  • Comments: This paper is a joint effort (by Small Arms Survey and the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies) to study the progress and potential of the movement against illegal small arms in South Asia. It uniquely explores local approaches and techniques and frames the issue as one of human insecurity from a “subjective” rather than “objective” standpoint – meaning that while it considers data and records, it does so for the ultimate purpose of assessing “the experience of people living in conflict zones and how the presence of small arms is conceived in relation to their personal security.”

• “India’s States of Armed Violence: Assessing the Human Cost and Political Priorities.” Small Arms Survey Issue Brief No.1. Small Arms Survey. September 2011.
  • Link: India’s States of Armed Violence
  • Comments: This brief concentrates on three particular problem areas within the larger armed violence issue in India: (1) insurgency; (2) terrorism; and (3) criminal violence. Each area is addressed through an assessment of trends and patterns as well as government action, spending, and policy. The brief emphasizes a lacking focus on the domestic side of the issue by the Indian government, which tends to emphasize international threats more greatly. Accordingly, the authors encourage greater attention on criminal elements, which leads to a large (and often understated) portion of India’s casualties.

• “India and the Arms Trade Treaty.” Oxfam Briefing Note. September 2006.
  • Link: India and the Arms Trade Treaty
  • Comments: This paper was published immediately prior to the October 2006 UN General Assembly – which was to focus heavily on the arms trade and the potential for an international Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Accordingly, the briefing advocates India’s participation and poses three chief reasons the ATT should be supported by India: (1) the ATT matches India’s own values and fits with India’s constitution; (2) the illegal arms trade is greatly harming India’s own citizens; and (3) the ATT would not hinder India’s legitimate arms production or trade, which remains one of the government’s main concerns.

• Malik, Salma and Mallika Joseph. Small Arms and the Security Debate in South Asia. Manohar Publishers: New Delhi, 2005.
  • Comments: Where much of the regional literature on small arms tends to focus on specific issues and occurrences of the problem, this book is one of the few to begin the discussion from a different perspective. It aims to situate the problem itself within the broader theoretical debate on security. The authors pose and attempt to address important questions that often get brushed over, particularly relating to why the small arms problem in South Asia is in fact a security threat. Moving beyond traditional assumptions that nation-building in South Asia will inherently be a violent process (as it was with the West as well), the authors attempt to look at the particular historical causes for this violent process in South Asia.

• Kartha, Tara. “Controlling the Black and Gray Markets in Small Arms in South Asia” in Light Weapons and Civil Conflict: Controlling the Tools of Violence. Eds. Jeffrey Boutwell and Michael T. Klare. Carnegie Corporation: New York, 1999.
  • Comments: This chapter points to the critical (but often ignored) distinction between the black and gray illegal arms markets in South Asia. Neither of these are new markets, but both have thrived in an unprecedented way due to the war in Afghanistan. While the black market is primarily profit-driven, the gray market is not. The latter “involves the machinery of the state in some form, notably where the government (or its agent) has either assisted in or turned a blind eye to illicit arms transfers originating from within its own territory or being organized by its national operating in other countries” (Boutwell and Klare, p. 51). This is a significant phenomenon in South Asia in light of states’ contributions to the arming of rebel, militant, or extremist groups – certainly a trend in India and Pakistan, but also in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.

Some South Asia Specific Articles & Speeches:

• Kapila, Subhash. “South Asia: Proliferation of Small Arms and its Impact on India’s Security.” Trancript. South Asia Analysis Group. March 2006.
  • Link: South Asia: Proliferation of Small Arms
  • Comments: Echoing Kofi Annan’s famous description of small arms as the real weapons of mass destruction, Kapila depicts South Asia as undisputable evidence of this reality. In a succinct and direct manner, he guides the audience through major observations and deductions on the region’s propensity for small arms proliferation before delving deeper into India’s particular challenges and vulnerabilities. It is all tied together with an analysis of the impact on India’s security – from strategic, political, economic, energy, and societal perspectives.

• Arputharaj, W. James. “The Crisis in South Asia.” Frontline Magazine. September 2001.
  • Link: The Crisis in South Asia
  • Comments: This brief article is useful for what it calls to attention. One important observation is that there is not enough regional cooperation to solve the issue of small arms proliferation in South Asia – unlike the more concerted efforts being made in Africa and Europe, for instance. The article also sets forth the characterization of India and Pakistan as suppliers as well as end-users of small arms, both legal and illegal. This may seem obvious, but it is interesting when the author contrasts these two countries with the others in South Asia – not all of which play the roles of both, broker and client.

• Sarwari, Bilal. “Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons.” Pakistan Law. 17 January 2010.
  • Link: Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons
  • Comments: This article looks at the small arms trade and manufacturing industry in Pakistan, breaking it down into three types of domestic producers: (1) the state-owned and public sector enterprise; (2) private manufacturers – which often operates under state license and regulation; and (3) the cottage industry – which escapes state supervision (including the Darra and Landi Kotal markets). The piece is useful for an initial understanding of how these three segments of the overall small arms market in Pakistan functions and who the key actors within it are.

• Gautam, Col. P.K. “Proliferation of Small Arms in South Asia and Human Security.” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies. 18 January 2003.
  • Link: Proliferation of Small Arms in South Asia
  • Comments: Though brief, this article points out quite a few useful considerations on the topic. It discusses the proliferation of small arms in South Asia in the context of three 21^st century trends: (1) most armed conflict has shifted from inter- to intra-state with the end of the 20^th century; (2) international disarmament efforts still tend to focus more on traditional weapons of mass destruction (especially nuclear ones) at the cost of offering sufficient attention to small arms – the main weapon used in such intrastate violence; and (3) civilians are now beginning to account for the highest percentage of casualties in small arms violence. The author argues that these factors should be a call to action for the international community.

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Some Useful General Resources

Now seems like a good time to share some initial resources I have come across as well as some interesting background reading materials. Where possible, links are provided. Two quick disclaimers: (1) the sources below are chosen for a broad background understanding on the global issue; and (2) this in no way claims to be a comprehensive list, but it is a start.

Please feel free to add to my list in the comments section if you can share key general sources I may have missed (or not yet discovered). If you wish to add South Asia specific items, you may prefer to wait for my forthcoming post with more focused sources. Until then, happy reading.

Some General Blogs & Online Information Portals:

• Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT) blog
• Link: NISAT blog
• Comments: NISAT is a reliable informational resource on the small arms trade. Other than its research component, the organization also runs a useful blog on small arms issues and news.

• Arms Control NOW – The Arms Control Association blog
• Link: Arms Control NOW
• Comments: The Arms Control Association is one of the original actors in the international movement against the illegal small arms trade. Its blog provides news and expert commentary on issues and progress. It is relevant for its first hand involvement as well as its immediate news releases.

• Small Arms Monitor
• Link: Small Arms Monitor
• Comments: Small Arms Monitor is a good resource for its “NGO reporting on the biennial meeting of states on small arms and light weapons.” Unlike other resources with vast pools of information on diverse issue areas, Small Arms Monitor is useful for its focused reporting on state policy changes and progress.        

• International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA)
• Link: IANSA
• Comments: IANSA considers itself a “global movement against gun violence” and has proved to be a critical actor. In itself, IANSA can serve as a beneficial case study in itself, especially for measuring goals and effectiveness. Additionally, the organization provides access to a great deal of background information and research.

• United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)
• Link: UNIDIR
• Comments: The UN is one of the most critical actors tying various regional networks together in the larger transnational network on the issue of small arms. UNIDIR serves as a support center and resource, with “action-oriented research [bringing] together perspectives on national, regional and international security, disarmament and development with a fundamental focus on human security.” One of the many relevant sub-pages of the UNIDIR website has valuable reports from its past research projects, ranging from Mapping Illicit Small Arms Trafficking in 2000 to Fixing the Broken Disarmament Machinery in 2010.

• Small Arms Survey
• Link: Small Arms Survey
• Comments: Small Arms Survey is one of the leading informational resources on the transnational advocacy network on small arms. It is widely accepted as one of the primary sources for tracking data and conflict related to small arms and its evidence is often used in reports and papers on the topic. 

Some General Books & Papers:

• Marsh, Nicholas. “Two Sides of the Same Coin? The Legal and Illegal Trade in Small Arms.” The Brown Journal of World Affairs. Spring 2002.
• Link: Two Sides of the Same Coin
• Comments: This may be one of the best introductory papers I’ve read on the subject of separating the legal and illegal small arms trade. It begins with an often forgotten fact – that many of today’s illegal weapons were originally made and sold legally. With an interesting structure, the paper gives readers a brief overview of the legal and illegal markets before concentrating on the gray market and ending with a few basic recommendations.

• Holtom, Paul and Mark Bromley. “The International Arms Trade: Difficult to Define, Measure, and Control.” Arms Control Association. August 2010.
• Link: The International Arms Trade
• Comments: Taking an interesting approach, this report looks at the relatively small effects of the global economic crisis on the international arms trade. It addresses arms trade trends in recent years as well as trade control efforts. Though much is yet to be learned about the real impacts of deteriorating global economic conditions on the illegal arms markets, this paper serves as an excellent base.

• “Arms Without Borders: Why a Globalised Trade Needs Global Controls.” Control Arms Campaign. October 2006.
• Link: Arms Without Borders
• Comments: This paper addresses the loopholes in the international production of small arms, where many such weapons disappear into the wrong hands due to very fluid and loose regulations on the production side. Instead of the traditional approach of tightening trade treaties, this paper advocates nipping the issue in the bud. This is an area of concern that deserves at least as much attention going forward as the development of a global treaty.

• “A Destruction Handbook – Small Arms, Light Weapons, Ammunition and Explosives.” United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs. 2001.
• Link: A Destruction Handbook
• Comments: To move away from theory and gain a more tangible picture of what can be done to curb illicit small arms violence, it is worth skimming this UN handbook. It begins with an overview of the problem before concretely presenting methods of destruction for small arms, among other weapons and explosives. I found that reading this kind of practical guide added color to my knowledge on actual and immediate steps governments can take.

• “Guns Out of Control: The Continuing Threat of Small Arms.” IRIN In-Depth Report. Integrated Regional Information Networks. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. May 2006.
• Link: Guns Out of Control
• Comments: This in-depth report gives a good briefing on several states in Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, Central Asia, and South Asia. The report also includes interviews with the UN Special Rapporteur on the prevention of human rights violations committed with small arms and light weapons; the Director of IANSA; the Manager of the Human Security and Small Arms Programme at the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue; and two former soldiers of the Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) engaged in several years of illicit small arms violence. Though many of the countries covered in the report are outside the direct focus of this blog, they give good context for the global situation.

• “Shooting Down the MDGs – How Irresponsible Arms Transfers Undermine Development Goals.” Oxfam Briefing Paper No. 120. Oxfam International. October 2008.
• Link: Shooting Down the MDGs
• Comments: This paper is not opposed to legal trade and transfers of weapons between countries. It recognizes a state’s legitimate right to defend itself. However, the paper notes that irresponsible transfers can fuel local conflicts and slow development progress. Accordingly, it presents an in-depth analysis and advocates for a robust global Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) with tougher enforcement and better controls on the international arm trade. This, according to the authors, would be a momentous step towards sealing some of the many loopholes that place ammunition in the wrong hands.

• Grimmett, Richard F. “Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2003-2010.” Congressional Research Service. September 2011.
• Link: Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations
• Comments: Those of us in the research community know that CRS often presents some of the most comprehensive reports and this is one of them. Updated annually, this latest congressional report examines general trends in global arms transfers before focusing on developing nations. The emphasis is on legal arms transfers, sales, and agreements. However, understanding the legal market is somewhat of a prerequisite to investigating the illegal market.

• Potter, Matt. Outlaws Inc. Bloombury USA: New York, 2011.
• Comments: This recently released book was written by a journalist that traveled with ex-Soviet soldiers who now use their skills and resources to smuggle arms and other illegal goods within the international black market. It offers insight on the perspectives and motives of the sellers propagating the arms black market and confirms that money – not violence itself – is often the endgame for the proliferators.

• Garcia, Denise. “Small Arms and Security: New Emerging International Norms.” Routledge: New York, 2006.
• Comments: This book systematically studies the trends in international norms governing the proliferation of small arms. It is helpful for understanding current patterns in global practices and shared norms in the international movement.

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Background and Significance

When one thinks of the international arms trade, what generally comes to mind are the state-to-state transactions, the multinational companies, and the myriad treaties regulating an endless list of weapon types. What is often glanced over in this fleeting image is the underground international arms trade. This invisible part of the international arms market has gained as much from globalization as the legal weapons industry. For many buyers, it has provided a way to stay under the radar. More importantly, it has provided this with less hassle, less fees, less supervision, less regulation, and less accountability than the legal market – from economic, political, legal, and moral standpoints.

Non-state armed groups (NSAGs) have largely been the target customer as well as the prime broker of small arms sold on the black market. There is an irony in the fact that the suppliers and the demanders of small arms must often rely on each other as lifeblood. These mutually dependent actors may not, and often do not, share ideologies or beliefs; issues or grievances. Yet business underground, it turns out, is not too different from business above ground.

Since the end of the Cold War, more so than ever before, there has been a substantive and exponential rise in the illegal smuggling and trading of small arms. In the last two decades, there has been a correspondingly powerful (but perhaps not powerful enough) international movement to control small arms. This movement has grown into a transnational advocacy network with the involvement of the United Nations and international NGOs. Regional and local groups have also been critical to the exchange of information and the drawing of attention to the violence and casualties caused by small arms.

This blog will focus on efforts in South Asia, particularly in India and Pakistan. The reason for choosing this region is that it is one of the most deeply affected areas in the world when it comes to small arms proliferation and violence. Recently, there seems to be growing interest from international actors to address the problem here. This could be because the overall global campaign is itself broadening its reach. It could also be because the war in Afghanistan has forced the world to witness the reality of small arms violence in the region.  Pakistan and India are geospatially fated to the causes and effects at play here. Needless to say, these two countries are also entangled in their own messy relationship – one that emphatically fuels small arms violence in the region.

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Welcome

Welcome to Small Arms S.Asia.

This blog will be dedicated to gathering and sharing information on small arms trafficking in Pakistan, India, and related areas. My posts will range from discussing news and expert analysis to governmental and advocacy efforts to control the small arms problem in South Asia. A key aim here will be identifying the critical actors on this issue area – from local to regional to international. Blog posts will also comment on current events and call attention to important developments and progress as well as problems and challenges. Over time, I hope to piece together a useful resource covering both sides of the issue – the illicit small arms trade as well as the international movement against it. To this end, your comments and participation will be valued here.

Thank you.

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PS: Round 2 will give a broad background on the topic to get the wheels spinning.